Poster Session
- Kris Johnson
- Analyzing Scrip Systems: Selection Rules and Optimality
- Maryam Ghaffari Saadat
- Towards Peer Governance of Social Systems: A Multi-disciplinary Formal Approach to Mechanism Design
- Takashi Tanaka
- A Faithful Distributed Implementation of Distributed Algorithms and Its Application to Real-time Electricity Pricing
- Yan Chen
- Learning and Decision Making with Negative Network Externality - Chinese Restaurant Game [1-2]
- Alan Deckelbaum
- General Collusion Resiliency in Dominant Strategies
- Zhenyu Lai
- Exclusive Preferential Placement as Search Diversion: Evidence from Flight Search
- Meixia Zhang
- A Model of Online Publishing: the Case of arXiv.org
- Chien-Ju Ho
- Adaptive Task Assignment for Crowdsourced Classification
- Morteza Zadimoghaddam
- Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weightand Cardinality
- Marco Pedroso
- Parametric Auctions in Practice
- Joong Bum Rhim
- Open Minded Advisers and Cumulative Prospect Theory
- Andrew Mao
- Toward A Better Understanding of Noisy Rankings
- Ankur Mani
- Generalized Stable Matching in Bipartite Networks
- Ankur Mani
- Fairness in Bipartite Matching with Transfers
- Saber Shokat Fadee
- The Network You Keep: Graphlet-Based Discrimination of Persons of Interest
- Zhenming Liu
- Steiner tree type algorithms in community detections
- Eric Sodomka
- A Predictive Model for Advertiser Value-Per-Click in Sponsored Search
- David Storch
- An Empirical Analysis of Auctioneer Profitability in QuiBids Penny Auctions
- Amy Greenwald
- Accounting for Price Dependencies in Simultaneous Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Eiichiro Kazumori
- Information Aggregation in Double Auctions with Interdependent Values
- Christian A. Moser
- A Mean Field Game Approach to Growth Theory
- Nicolás Della Penna
- Market Making and Liquidity Provision
- Greg Stoddard
- A Theoretical Analysis of Crowdsourced Curation
- Bo Waggoner
- Information Elicitation Without Verification
- Oleksandr Tavro
- Performance Modeling of Multithreaded Programs
- Lirong Xia
- How Many Vote Operations Are Needed to Manipulate a Voting System?
- Emir Kavurmacioglu
- Competition in Private Commons: Price War or Market Sharing?
CAEC Sponsors
We thank Microsoft Research New England for their kind sponsorship of this event.
Steering Committee
-
Harvard SEAS
Yiling Chen (Co-Organizer) -
MIT EECS
Silvio Micali (Co-Organizer) -
MIT EECS
Costis Daskalakis -
Harvard Econ
Greg Lewis -
MIT Sloan
Andrew Lo -
Harvard SEAS
David Parkes
Location
Singleton Auditorium (46-3002) (Map)Brain and Cognitive Sciences/McGovern Bldg.
43 Vassar Street, Cambridge, MA 02139
How to get there
(a) Take the T (red line to Kendall Square stop, and then walk for 5 minutes), or
(b) If you drive, you can park at one of the nearby public garages.
Important Dates
- Submission deadline
- Thursday April 11, 2013
- Notification
- Monday April 15, 2013
- Registration deadline
- Monday April 22, 2013
- CAEC'13
- Friday April 26, 2013